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Russia’s Contract Arbitrage  
Anna Gelpern
1
 
 
Abstract: 
Ukraine is poised to restructure its debt, but Russia may hold the best cards in the negotiation. 
Russia bought $3 billion in Ukrainian eurobonds in late 2013 to prop up a political ally, since-
deposed. As Russian President Vladimir Putin himself has pointed out, these bonds have unique 
terms that let Russia call for early repayment, putting it ahead of Ukraine’s private creditors. 
Meanwhile, Russia and its proxies hold enough bonds to block a restructuring vote or hold out, 
sticking more losses on other creditors. Russia has refused to restructure the bonds in the Paris 
Club of government-to-government creditors, claiming that they are commercial debt. In all, 
Russia has effectively arbitraged the prevailing sovereign debt regime, where public and private 
lending to sovereigns are separated by legal form and restructuring institutions. Because the 
bonds in question are governed by English law, the U.K. Parliament can limit the scope for 
abuse by making them unenforceable. Such legislation has ample precedent, and would compare 
favorably to traditional sanctions. Uniquely among sanctions,it would not only punish Russia, 
but could deliver immediate financial relief for Ukraine. 
  
*** 
Ukraine has two debt problems. First, it faces shrinking revenues, rising costs, and a spike in 
foreign debt payments over the next two years. This is a common problem, easily managed with 
familiar market tools and international institutions. Ukraine’s other debt problem is less common 
and hardly manageable: its leading bond holder is annexing parts of its territory and stoking 
militant separatists from within. 
Together the two debt problems reveal a gap in the international financial architecture. The 
system is set up as if market finance and political patronage were distinct, for reasons having as 
much to do with administrative convenience as with ideological conviction. When governments 
participate as debtors or creditors in the global capital markets, they are expected to use private 
deal technology, and abide by the rules and incentives of these markets. When governments put 
on their power-political hats, they are expected to retreat to political fora, removed from the 
markets. Being sovereign, they do not have to. 
                                                          
1
 Georgetown Law and Peterson Institute for International Economics. I am grateful to Anders Åslund, Will 
Chamberlain, Mitu Gulati, Adam Levitin, Douglas A. Rediker, Jeffrey J.Schott, Brad Setser, Edwin M. Truman, and 
Ángel Ubide for comments. A more recent policy brief based on the article is here.  
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Russia put itself in a position to arbitrage the gap when it structured a $3 billion loan to gain 
advantage over Ukraine’s private and public creditors alike. It lent the money to prop up an ally, 
Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych, who was deposed two months later. The unusual debt 
contracts were designed to keep Ukraine “on a tight leash.” The bonds were scheduled to mature 
in only two years, and gave Russia broad latitude to demand early repayment, trigger default, 
hold out in a debt restructuring, and sabotage any debt negotiations that might accompany 
Ukraine’s territorial break-up. Meanwhile, Russia stands to reap more than any other bondholder 
from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) program for Ukraine, which unlocked $33 billion in 
donor funds through 2016. 
Since the key $3 billion contract is governed by English law, the simplest way to neutralize it 
would be for the U.K. Parliament to pass a law making the bond unenforceable. Debt sanctions 
of this sort would not preclude Ukraine from paying Russia as part of a political settlement. But 
without sanctions, Russia could profit financially and politically from its arbitrage of the private 
contract form, tainting the London market and the English courts. 
Going forward, narrowly drawn debt sanctions could fill a gap in the international system. These 
might prevent parties from entering into abusive contracts to begin with—or prevent them from 
enforcing existing contracts abusively. Properly designed, they can promote more effective 
sanctions and a sovereign debt regime that is both more just and more efficient.  
 
A Manageable Debt
2
 
Ukraine’s debt looks modest compared to Euro area crisis countries, which had captured 
sovereign debt headlines for the past four years.  In early 2014, Ukraine reported its public debt 
stock at just over $73 billion, including $13 billion in state guarantees for Naftogaz (the state gas 
monopoly), the state infrastructure fund, and others. The government and the IMF estimated 
public debt at slightly above 40 per cent of Ukraine’s gross domestic product (GDP) at the end of 
2013; rising to over 63 per cent by 2015 partly thanks to an influx of multilateral loans for the 
new government. In contrast, Greece had zoomed past 150 per cent when it launched its debt 
restructuring. At the end of 2013, Ukraine’s public external debt was slightly over half of its total 
public debt; foreign currency debt (including domestic debt in foreign currency) was almost 60 
per cent of the total. 
                                                          
2
 Throughout this section, unless otherwise indicated, debt figures are drawn from the IMF program tables.  See 
INT’L MONETARY FUND, UKRAINE: REQUEST FOR A STAND-BY  ARRANGEMENT—STAFF REPORT 36-39 tbl.2-4 
(2014), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=41516.0; Ukraine, Bond Prospectus—
U.S. $1,984,838,800 5.00 per cent Notes due 2015, pp. 137-58 (Feb. 17, 2014), 
http://www.centralbank.ie/regulation/securities-
markets/prospectus/Lists/ProspectusDocuments/Attachments/19034/Prospectus%20-%20Standalone%20(3).pdf.  
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In its $17 billion initial program for Ukraine, the IMF concluded that government debt was 
“sustainable with high probability” despite risks from capital flight, shaky banks, and a fragile 
currency. This diagnosis had both analytical and practical significance. The two-year program 
stood at about 800 per cent of Ukraine’s IMF quota, an exceptional level of financing that 
triggers additional debt scrutiny. IMF policy precludes it from lending more than twice the 
member’s quota in one year unless the country’s debt is sustainable with high probability.3 This 
requirement is understood to protect IMF resources and the chances of restoring the member’s 
balance of payments. If debt is unsustainable, the IMF would expect the country to restructure it 
as a condition of support. When it approved the initial program, it did not ask Ukraine to 
restructure. 
Any debt sustainability judgment for Ukraine was best viewed as provisional, subject to 
economic uncertainties as well as “uncertainties that come from geopolitics.”4  First, quite apart 
from its conflict with Russia, Ukraine could not pay its debts in the near term without help from 
abroad. It reported owing over $10 billion in principal and another $3.5 billion in interest to 
foreign creditors before the end of 2015, and nearly $21 billion more before the end of 2020. 
(Table 1) Friendly governments and multilateral organizations stepped into the breach with over 
$30 billion (Table 2), which was thought sufficient in the spring of 2014 to allow Ukraine to 
repay all the debts coming due and meet its other projected foreign currency needs through 2016. 
The plan was to come back to the capital markets in 2015 and 2016. In the long term, because 
most donor support came in the form of loans, it would add to Ukraine’s debt stock and 
transform it from mostly private to mostly public. 
  
                                                          
3
 Other criteria for exceptional access are the country’s exceptional balance of payments need, favorable prospects 
for accessing the private capital markets, and the likely success of the IMF program.  The IMF’s program in Greece 
established an exception to the access criteria to allow lending even when the member’s debt is not sustainable with 
high probability, where there is high risk of international spillovers. See Int’l Monetary Fund, Greece: Ex Post 
Evaluation of Exceptional Access under the 2010 Stand-By Arrangement 1 (2013); 36 Int’l Monetary Fund, Selected 
Decisions and Selected Documents of the International Monetary Fund 456 (2011).  
4
 Ian Talley, IMF Approves $17 Billion Emergency Aid for Ukraine’s Economy, Wall Street Journal, April 30, 2014,   
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303948104579534140466543308.  
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 Table 1: Public External Debt Service 
(US$ million; Source: Ministry of Finance, Ukraine Prospectus dated February 17, 2014) 
 
 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 
Interest 1607.4 1912.2 1790.8 896.7 596.3 588.9 580.3 
Principal 4267.5 5815.7 8759.1 4335.8 559.3 519.5 2054.9 
Total 5874.9 7727.9 10549.9 5232.5 1155.6 1108.4 2635.2 
 
Second, Ukraine has a spotty debt history, and a spotty history of performance under IMF 
programs. It last restructured its public debt in 2000, when it was under 60 per cent of its GDP.
5
 
State-owned Naftogaz restructured its bonds in 2009.
6
 In addition, Ukraine’s past programs with 
the IMF had routinely failed to deliver promised policy reform.
7
 History need not determine the 
future—the new government, eager to turn a new leaf, satisfied a number of difficult policy 
conditions before the first IMF disbursement—but history also cautions against over-reliance on 
magic numbers, such as the ratio of debt to GDP. Whether for external, institutional, or historical 
reasons, “living with debt” has not been Ukraine’s strong suit.8  
Table 2: Donor Pledges 
(Source: IMF) 
 
Source Pledged for 
2014-2016 
(US$ Billion) 
International Monetary Fund 17.1 
European Commission 2.9 
European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, European Investment Bank 
8.1 
The World Bank 3.9 
United States 1.0 
Total 33.0 
 
                                                          
5
 FEDERICO STURZENEGGER & JEROMIN ZETTELMEYER, DEBT DEFAULTS AND LESSONS FROM A DECADE OF CRISES 
129 (2006) at 127. 
6
 See Udaibir S. Das et al., Sovereign Debt Restructurings 1950-2010: Literature Survey, Data, and Stylized Facts 
57 (IMF Working Paper No. 12/203, 2012), available at 
http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/ecosoc/debt/2013/IMF_wp12_203.pdf. 
7
 See Int’l Monetary Fund, Ukraine and the IMF, http://www.imf.org/external/country/UKR/INDEX.htm (last 
visited May 7, 2014). 
8
 See Eduardo Borensztein et al., Inter-American Development Bank, Living with Debt: How to Limit the Risks of 
Sovereign Finance 232 (2006); Carmen M. Reinhart et al., Debt Intolerance, 1 Brookings Papers on Econ. Activity 
1, 40 (2003). 
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Third, Ukraine needs large amounts of hard currency to pay for energy imports. The IMF 
estimated Ukraine’s gas imports at $36.5 billion for 2011-2013, nearly all from Russia. When the 
two countries were on good terms, Ukraine got a discount on its gas bills. When they were not, 
Russia threatened to cut off gas supplies. Since the conflict began, Russia hiked the price and 
claimed billions of dollars in arrears, much of it disputed by Ukraine. While the dispute is in 
arbitration in Stockholm, Ukraine scrambles to find alternative suppliers and supply routes; 
meanwhile, the IMF estimated that gas payments would consume about $10 billion per year for 
the foreseeable future, even if Ukraine implemented reforms to make its energy sector more 
efficient. Combined with a high level of foreign currency debt, this makes Ukraine vulnerable to 
exchange rate fluctuations as well as volatile energy prices.
9
 
Fourth, with the eastern part of the country in violent turmoil, the size of Ukraine’s economy and 
central government resources going forward is anyone’s guess. The loss of Crimea and 
Sevastopol, which accounted for less than 5 per cent of Ukraine’s GDP and relied on transfers 
from Kyiv, had a limited effect on economic forecasts. In contrast, the east and the south 
represent over 20 per cent of GDP, the bulk of its industry and exports. Even if the security crisis 
ended in autonomy rather than secession for these regions, the prospects of fiscal transfers to the 
center look dubious. 
Fifth, the Russian government and state-owned firms hold over $5 billion in Ukrainian bond 
claims by some estimates.
10
 This includes the $3 billion issue highlighted in the introduction to 
this essay, which matures in December 2015 and represents by far the biggest bond payment due 
during the IMF program period.
11
 Even if Ukraine continues to pay this debt in full and on time, 
the contract terms enable Russia to demand early repayment, triggering a cascade of defaults. If 
Ukraine’s economic situation deteriorates, or if its territory breaks up, the bonds are structured to 
give Russia extra leverage in any debt negotiations that might follow.  
 
Tainted Notes 
Viktor Yanukovych was a kleptocrat who ran a corrupt and ultimately violent government. 
Ukraine’s outstanding government debt rose during his four-year term, while a tiny elite lived 
large off state favors. Yanukovych got a $3 billion lifeline from Russian President Vladimir 
Putin in December 2013 to help keep him in power and reward him for turning away from an 
Association Agreement with the European Union. It did not work: Yanukovych was deposed and 
escaped to Russia three months later, after protests where government snipers are accused of 
                                                          
9
 Additional foreign currency demands may come from banks and non-financial firms that borrowed abroad. 
Because much of this borrowing was from foreign affiliates, it is more likely to roll over.  
10
 See Dragon Capital, Ukrainian Economy: Public F/X Debt Service Schedule for 2014-1Q15 1 (2014). 
11
 This does not include conventional government-to-government (Paris Club) claims, the arrears claimed by 
Gazprom, or Russian claims on private Ukrainian entities, which would contribute to the demands on foreign 
exchange reserves. Ukraine reported owing Russia a little over $700 million in Paris Club debt.  
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killing 100 people in one day. The debt became his parting gift to the people of Ukraine and an 
arbitrage opportunity for President Putin. 
At the time, Ukraine ranked 144 out of 175 on the Transparency International Corruption 
Perception Index and 134 out of 142 on its Judicial Independence Index; it was in the 25
th
 
percentile in the Rule of Law Index.
12
 A few oligarchs had controlled the country’s industry 
since the post-Soviet privatizations of the 1990s, benefitting from broken tax and public 
procurement systems, as most people struggled to make ends meet.
13
 The former president faces 
charges of stealing tens of billions of dollars in public funds. One of his homes had a private zoo 
with $10,000 name plates for the animals, paid by the state.
14
 Since Yanukovych’s departure, 
prosecutors have begun the search for embezzled money scattered through shell companies, 
offshore trusts, and secret bank accounts around the world.
15
 
Borrowing from Russia was nothing new for Ukraine, but this debt was different. It came in the 
form of tradable notes listed on the Irish Stock Exchange and governed by English law, 
indistinguishable in most ways from Ukraine’s eleven other outstanding bond market issues. 
Government-to-government budget support normally takes the form of inter-governmental credit 
agreements, which do not trade in the private markets and are not meant to be enforced in court. 
When such credits run into trouble, creditors do not go to court, but to the Paris Club, an 
informal group of governments hosted by the French treasury since 1956.
16
 Russia has been a 
member since 1997, and has participated in the club’s Ukrainian debt restructurings before.  
Some market reports suggest that documenting the Yanukovych bailout as a garden-variety 
eurobond made it easier for Russia to advance the money quickly through its sovereign wealth 
fund (Box 1).
17
 It had two other advantages. First, because the notes can trade in the private 
capital markets, Russia can easily exit its Ukrainian investment. Second, contractual links 
between the Yanukovych notes and Ukraine’s other private debt give Russia the power to 
destabilize Ukraine’s private debt stock. For example, default on the Yanukovych notes would 
count as default under Ukraine’s other bonds, and may trigger payments under credit default 
swap (CDS) contracts on Ukraine (Box 4). It is common for bonds to “cross-default” in this way 
to other bonds; it is unusual for them to cross-default to public sector credits. The rationale 
behind segmentation is that private bondholders and government creditors have different motives 
                                                          
12
Corruption by Country/Territory, Ukraine, Transparency International, 
http://www.transparency.org/country#UKR_DataResearch_SurveysIndices (last visited April 20, 2014).    
13
 INT’L FINANCE CORP., THE WORLD BANK, COUNTRY PARTNERSHIP STRATEGY FOR UKRAINE ¶ 41 (2012). 
14
 Asset Recovery Workers on the Case of Ukrainian Kleptocrats, NAT’L PUBLIC RADIO, March 6, 2014, 
http://www.npr.org/2014/03/06/286646514/asset-recovery-workers-on-the-case-of-ukrainian-kleptocrats.  
15
 Ukraine’s Stolen Assets: A Long, Hard Slog, ECONOMIST, March 5, 2014, 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/easternapproaches/2014/03/ukraine-s-stolen-assets.  
16
 See Club De Paris, http://www.clubdeparis.org (last visited May 8, 2014).  
17
 Ukraine Debt: An Investor’s Guide, EUROPE EMERGING MARKETS RESEARCH (J.P. Morgan), March 27, 2014, at 
11-12.  
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and different relationships with the sovereign debtor.
18
 The Yanukovych notes give Russia the 
benefit of private contract linkages, without the private investors’ profit constraints.  
  
Box 1 
Sovereign Wealth Deployed 
Russia bought the Yanukovych notes with money from its sovereign wealth fund, whose stated 
mission had been to channel oil revenues into public pension savings. It did so in apparent 
contravention of the fund’s stated policy of investing in debt rated AA- or higher.19 Ukraine’s 
debt was rated CCC by Standard & Poors; its highest rating in the preceding five years was B+. 
The fact that the note purchase violated the wealth fund’s investment policy implies political 
motive. 
The fact that the Yanukovych bailout was a political power play is not a big revelation. For the 
moment, the Russian fund’s Ukrainian adventure may be of greatest concern to the Russian 
citizens whose pensions are at risk. Judging from the opinion polls, they may not mind.
20
  
However, such blatantly political deployment of sovereign wealth is embarrassing for the 
emerging international regime governing sovereign wealth funds. The 2008 Santiago Principles, 
a voluntary code of conduct agreed among funds from 25 countries, including Russia, were 
adopted partly in response to accusations of political investment.
21
 The rhetoric surrounding the 
principles and the International Forum on Sovereign Wealth Funds paint the funds as 
commercial investment vehicles, aspiring to market and technocratic credibility, free of domestic 
political control. The principles commit member funds to disclose political investment, although 
they do not strictly prohibit it.
22
 Russia’s use of its wealth fund to prop up a political ally is not a 
breach, but it runs counter to the motivation behind the principles, and is surely awkward for 
those arguing that sovereign wealth funds are just another bunch of commercial actors. 
                                                          
18
 Sovereigns that spend years in arrears to the Paris Club might scrupulously service their bonds. Bondholders 
whose goal is to get paid would not want to trigger a default if they think that the sovereign debtor’s default on the 
Paris Club would free up money to pay them. 
19
 International Forum on Sovereign Wealth Funds, Members Information, Russia, at 
http://www.ifswf.org/members-info.htm#rus (last accessed on April 21, 2014). 
20
 See Alec Luhn, Russian Opinion Divided over Seizure of Crimea but Majority Likely to Back Putin, GUARDIAN, 
March 3, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/03/russian-opinion-split-crimea-ukraine-most-back-
putin 
21
 See EDWIN M. TRUMAN, PETERSON INSTITUTE FOR INT’L ECON., IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES 
FOR SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS: A PROGRESS REPORT 2 (2013); ALLIE E. BAGNALL & EDWIN M. TRUMAN, 
PETERSON INSTITUTE FOR INT’L ECON., IFSWF REPORT ON COMPLIANCE WITH THE SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES: 
ADMIRABLE BUT FLAWED TRANSPARENCY 1 (2011). 
22
 INT’L WORKING GRP. OF SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS, SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS GENERALLY ACCEPTED 
PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES: SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES 15 (2008). Santiago Principle 19 and commentary to principles 
2, 6, 9, 12, and 16 attempt to discourage politically-motivated investment.  See id. at 12-22; TRUMAN, supra note 21, 
at 1-2. 
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If Ukraine tried to renegotiate its bonds, Russia could block it, or force other creditors to absorb 
all the losses. Because Russia holds 100 per cent of the Yanukovych note issue, other creditors 
cannot use majority amendment (collective action) clauses to make restructuring terms binding 
on Russia (Box 2). Moreover, Russia’s $3 billion stake could easily keep Ukraine from reaching 
the minimum creditor participation threshold typically required for a restructuring to proceed. 
Russia’s direct holdings are 14 per cent of the outstanding principal of government and 
government-guaranteed foreign bonds, or about 17 per cent not counting the guarantees—and 
over one-third of the principal maturing through 2016. Holdings by state-owned and captive 
creditors would raise the numbers considerably. In sum, Russia holds the veto over any market-
based debt restructuring or reprofiling that Ukraine might want to undertake. 
 
Box 2 
Collective Action Problems and Collective Action Clauses 
A government that seeks to restructure its bonds can ask the creditors to amend its debt contracts, 
or to exchange their bonds for new ones with a more favorable payment profile. Whether the 
debtor seeks a deep principal reduction or a modest rescheduling of payments, the process is the 
same. The success of the operation depends on all or most creditors going along with the new 
terms. 
A creditor who refuses to amend or hand in its old contracts can sue for full payment. This has 
led to concern on the part of the IMF, the Paris Club, and others that “holdout” creditors would 
block or free ride on restructurings. Other creditors would refuse to participate for fear that their 
concessions benefit the holdouts; they too would demand to be paid in full. Such creditor 
collective action problems provide an important rationale for individual and corporate 
bankruptcy. There is no bankruptcy for sovereign governments.
23
 
Absent bankruptcy, holdout creditors can be partly neutralized with contract provisions that 
allow a majority of creditors (ranging from 50 to 85 per cent) to bind the dissenting minority. 
Once bound to the new terms, creditors cannot sue on the original contract. Such “collective 
action clauses” (CACs) have long been customary in English-law bonds, including Ukraine’s.  
Ukraine can normally amend any of its foreign bonds with the consent of creditors holding just 
over half of the outstanding principal: three-quarters of a two-thirds quorum at a bondholder 
                                                          
23
 See generally Kenneth Rogoff & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Bankruptcy Procedures for Sovereigns: A History of Ideas, 
1976-2001, 49 IMF Staff Papers 470 (discussing the history of proposals for sovereign bankruptcy). 
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meeting.
24
 Ukraine’s bonds do not provide for aggregated voting, which would allow creditors 
across different bond issues to vote on amendment. Aggregation terms are still rare in foreign 
sovereign bonds; those that exist allow creditors holding over a third of any bond issue to force 
that issue out of the restructuring. 
Because Russia holds 100 per cent of the Yanukovych notes, it can be certain of holding out. 
CACs are irrelevant to it—with or without aggregation. 
The power of CACs to block holdout lawsuits is often exaggerated. Although Russia’s 100 per 
cent stake in Ukraine’s bond is an outlier, it is common for creditors to buy blocking positions in 
a single bond issue—particularly a small one, trading at a deep discount—and prevent that issue 
from being amended. For example, when Greece restructured its bonds in 2012, more than half 
of its English-law bonds with CACs were able to drop out of the bond exchange.
25
 These bonds 
continue to be paid on schedule.  
One way to overcome holdouts is to hold a single stock-wide restructuring vote, as Greece did 
with its Greek-law bonds. Individual bond series cannot drop out in this scenario if a high 
enough majority of the remaining bondholders votes in favor of a restructuring. This mechanism 
was introduced retroactively by statute in Greece. Recent reforms supported by the IMF and the 
International Capital Market Association would introduce stock-wide aggregated voting by 
contract. Ukraine has no such aggregation provisions.   
 
Two unusual terms in the Yanukovych notes give Russia yet more control over Ukraine’s debt 
outcomes. First, unlike all other debt issued or guaranteed by the Ukrainian government, these 
notes promise to keep government and guaranteed debt under 60% of Ukraine’s nominal GDP.26 
Ukraine might find itself in debt default simply because its economy collapses, say, thanks to 
losing territory, new trade barriers with Russia, or civil unrest. Put differently, the bond contracts 
boost Russia’s economic influence over Ukraine as it chips away at the denominator of the 
debt/GDP fraction. The debt/GDP term could also make the Yanukovych notes more attractive to 
private investors in the secondary market, since it allows the note holders to demand payment 
ahead of other creditors, whose bonds do not have the clause. As a result, Russia might fetch a 
higher price for the Yanukovych notes than a private investor selling a comparable Ukrainian 
eurobond. 
                                                          
24
 Quorum at postponed meetings goes down to 1/3. Ukraine’s bond disclosure specifies the quorum, but not the 
required supermajority; 75 per cent is common in the London market. (Allen & Overy 2014)  
25
 Jeromin Zettelmeyer et al., The Greek Debt Restructuring: An Autopsy 14 n.24 (Peterson Institute for Int’l Econ., 
Working Paper No. 13-8, 2013) available at http://www.iie.com/publications/wp/wp13-8.pdf. 
26
 See Ukraine Prospectus, supra note 2, at 28 (“Debt Ratio”). 
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Russia also has the right to accelerate the notes if Ukraine fails to pay any entity “controlled or 
majority-owned” by Russia.27 This provision, unique to the Yanukovych notes, may have been 
intended to cover debt to Gazprom. When the notes were issued, Russia was already claiming 
billions in arrears under contracts between Naftogaz and Gazprom; some but not all are 
disputed.
28
 Depending on how the clause is interpreted, the Yanukovych notes might be callable 
at any time.
29
 
The debt/GDP and cross-default clauses in Russia’s financing for Yanukovych, along with its 
two-year maturity, are consistent with Russia’s reported intent to keep Ukraine “on a short 
leash.”30 Russia used the private contract form under English law to take maximum advantage of 
the prevailing international regime for sovereign debt management, protecting its financial and 
political interests, and increasing its leverage over Ukraine, its private and public creditors. 
 
  
                                                          
27
 See id. at 27, 31 (“Relevant Indebtedness,” “Events of Default-Indebtedness of Ukraine”). 
28
 Ukraine claims that it does not owe the money because it never took delivery of the gas; it contests the “take or 
pay” promise. See id. at 16. 
29
 At least two alternative readings would be more favorable to Ukraine. First, any arrears are likely owed by 
Naftogaz, not the government directly. However, the bond language appears to cover a broad range of guarantees 
and indemnities given by Ukraine. While the gas contracts between Russia and Ukraine are not public, Ukraine has 
frequently recapitalized Naftogaz to enable payments to Russia. Second, the notes are held by the Russian sovereign 
wealth fund, not Russia directly. The National Wealth Fund is not the majority-owner of Gazprom. However, if the 
National Wealth Fund has no distinct personality from the Russian government, the clause would still cover 
Gazprom. On the other hand, if Russia sells all or part of its holdings, private buyers that do not own or control 
Gazprom may not be able to invoke the clause. 
30
 Kathrin Hille, Ukraine bailout could derail Putin’s drive to boost Russian economy, FINANCIAL TIMES, Dec. 18, 
2013, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/3b3db13c-67e3-11e3-a905-00144feabdc0.html#axzz313qckIHW. 
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Odious Outcasts 
Could Ukraine repudiate the Yanukovych notes on the grounds that Russia’s loan was 
illegitimate and oppressive? 
A hundred years ago, the need to collect on sovereign debt for private creditors justified 
invasions.
31
 Over the course of the 20
th
 century, formal separation of politics and commerce 
became the trend in sovereign lending and borrowing.
32
 The modern regime for sovereign debt 
management is based on economic necessity, normally established as part of the IMF program, 
to the exclusion of politics and justice. Russia’s holdings of Ukrainian debt challenge the 
prevailing regime. 
An alternative theory holds that debt is “odious” to the state when a government borrows without 
the consent of the people and not in their interest.
33
 Odious Debt would compel governments to 
default on illegitimate debt even if they could pay it. Odious Debt has repeatedly captured 
academic and civil society imaginations. However, it has failed to alter existing debt 
restructuring institutions. 
In 2014, bondholders can and do sue governments in foreign courts. Sovereign debtors 
renegotiate private bank loans in law firm conference rooms and restructure bonds in securities 
offerings, using market-based transactional techniques. Government-to-government debt is dealt 
with in a separate forum, under separate rules, loosely linked to private debt outcomes. Questions 
of political legitimacy lurk awkwardly in the background for cases like Iraq and Vietnam. 
Since 1997, nineteen countries have restructured their bonds, with over 90% of their creditors 
participating. Four of the nineteen had to restructure twice in less than a decade. Thirteen of the 
nineteen, including Ukraine, restructured bonds owed to foreigners. In the same period, half a 
dozen, including Ukraine, restructured foreign bank loans and supplier credits.
34
 In all but one of 
                                                          
31
 See generally Faisal Z. Ahmed et al., Lawsuits and empire: On the Enforcement of Sovereign Debt in Latin 
America, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 39 (2010) (discussing “gunboat diplomacy” in Latin America). 
32
 See generally Mark C. Weidemayer, Sovereign Immunity and Sovereign Debt, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2014).  But see Louis A. Pérez, Jr. & Deborah M. Weissman, Public Power and Private Purpose: Odious Debt and 
the Political Economy of Hegemony, 32 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 699, 742-45 (discussing how American 
political interests affected the American response to Costa Rica’s default). 
33
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 See Elena Duggar, Moody’s Investors Service, New Evidence on the Role of Holdout Creditors in Sovereign Debt 
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these cases, debt relief was justified in economic terms. Countries restructured either because 
they had no foreign currency to pay the debt coming due in the near term, or because their debt 
had been judged unsustainable in the medium term: even with economic reforms and new 
financing, the debt would keep growing, outpacing their capacity to repay.  
The sole exception was Ecuador, which launched a bond buy-back offer in 2008, threatening 
default because a presidential audit commission “found significant indications of illegality and 
illegitimacy.”35 Allegations of illegitimacy ranged from failure to obtain proper authorizations to 
hostile interest rate hikes by the U.S. Federal Reserve; they were and continue to be contested.
36
 
Nonetheless, Ecuador secured nearly 70 per cent relief on the debt in the exchange.
37
 The IMF 
pointedly refused to intervene, citing a policy of staying out of politics.
38
 
The Ecuador exception proved the rule: despite a rich record of corruption, military intervention, 
and human rights abuse, governments seeking debt relief in recent decades have stuck to arguing 
that they cannot afford to pay. Even post-apartheid South Africa and post-Saddam Iraq 
specifically refused to invoke Odious Debt.
39
 This may have something to do with the fact that 
Odious Debt as a doctrine of law is cumbersome to invoke; it is also true that creditors and 
debtors have limited incentives to make it better. 
Odious Debt is narrow, unwieldy and uncertain. In the original formulation, it applies to state 
succession (for example, territorial break-up), but not to a change in government. The present 
scope and force of the doctrine are unclear because scholars disagree about the legal significance 
of historical precedent, ranging from the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution 
(repudiating Confederate debts in 1868) to Germany’s refusal to assume Austrian debt in 1938.40 
They also disagree about the meaning of odiousness: is it limited to money used by tyrants to 
torture and oppress? What about kleptocracy? … or wasteful spending by elected officials?41 
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Then there is the institutional gap. Absent sovereign bankruptcy, there is no central place to 
decide odiousness. Debt audit commissions established after the fall of a despotic regime—
alongside truth and reconciliation commissions for human rights abuses—may be the most 
logical and morally satisfying institutional home for Odious Debt.
42
  These have not taken root, 
perhaps because sifting through a mountain of debt contracts is time-consuming and expensive, 
while new governments and their creditors are often eager to get on with new borrowing and 
economic recovery. With no new institutions, Odious Debt could act as an equitable limit on the 
debtor’s duty to repay—but it would have to be developed and applied by the courts presiding 
over debtor-creditor lawsuits in the current fragmented system.
43
 This would require debtors to 
invoke Odious Debt as grounds for nonpayment. They have not done so. 
Public and private creditors have successfully preempted calls for relief of illegitimate debt by 
offering relief for unsustainable debt. New governments that inherit debt from tyrants and 
kleptocrats face the choice of relatively quick and certain relief on economic grounds, or a long, 
contentious and uncertain battle for relief on political grounds. Although the trade-off might be 
worth it for some, it is unsurprising that so few try. Government creditors in particular have been 
reluctant to endorse nonpayment of politically motivated debt, since this would undermine much 
of their own lending. Thus while the United States in 2003 might have been happy to support 
Iraq’s repudiation of Saddam Hussein’s debt on the grounds that he was a murderous tyrant, U.S. 
officials in 1993 were less enthusiastic about Vietnam’s refusal to repay military debt thinly 
disguised as agricultural credits in 1971.
44
 
In sum, the existing regime for foreign sovereign borrowing and restructuring remains anchored 
in economic need. Debt negotiations take place in multiple venues following the parameters of 
the IMF program. Fairness and legitimacy are shut out of the process, because the participants 
have few incentives to invoke them. This regime is unlikely to work for Ukraine. First, Russia’s 
contracts give it the capacity to trigger a debt crisis and block any restructuring that Ukraine 
might need as a result. Second, paying Russia while it fights Ukraine would be unjust, even if 
Ukraine could afford it. 
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A Sanctions Alternative 
Ukraine’s allies and benefactors face a stark choice. The path of least resistance is to use public 
money to reward Russia’s arbitrage and add to Ukraine’s debt stock. The alternative—a debt 
restructuring, however mild—would have to reckon with Russia and creditors controlled or 
influenced by Russia. These creditors may not respond to market incentives. On the other hand, 
paying them in full might feel unfair and politically risky, potentially undermining popular 
support for aid to Ukraine and the multilateral institutions vital to its recovery.
45
 
Ukraine could simply refuse to pay the Yanukovych notes. It is unlikely that Russia would sue to 
enforce them in an English court. More plausibly, Russia might sell the notes to a private 
investor. In the best possible case scenario, the new buyer would act just like any other 
commercial creditor—even if it might pay Russia more for the extra protection embedded in the 
debt/GDP and cross-default clauses. In the worst case, the buyer could be a bank or a firm doing 
Russia’s bidding. If the new private creditor triggers a default and sues to collect, Ukraine could 
try to defend by invoking Odious Debt; however, a court is unlikely to punish the new investor 
for Russia’s “short-leash” support of Yanukovych. At a minimum, failure to pay could damage 
Ukraine’s market reputation and, through the various contract linkages, cause a string of 
disruptions—which would play into Russia’s hands. 
As an alternative to unilateral repudiation by Ukraine, the United Kingdom could enact 
legislation making the Yanukovych notes unenforceable under English law. An Act of 
Parliament would limit Russia’s capacity to disrupt Ukraine’s debt service and any future debt 
negotiations. (Box 3) Commercial investors would have no interest in unenforceable contracts; 
as a result, Russia would find it hard to rescue its investment by selling the notes in the capital 
markets. Ukraine would suffer no reputational fallout, since the action would be taken by the 
United Kingdom. Ukraine would retain the option to pay the notes as part of a political 
settlement, but would be in a better bargaining position getting there. Future lenders would be on 
notice that using the capital markets to control neighboring countries could backfire. 
A law targeting Russia’s holdings of Ukrainian bonds would build on recent European and U.K. 
measures to shield Iraq and heavily indebted poor countries from debt collection, as well as a 
contract sanctions proposal from the Center for Global Development Working Group on the 
Prevention of Odious Debt (the CGD Group). It is also in line with the contract sanctions 
consultation document issued earlier this year by the U.K. Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
                                                          
45
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(FCO).
46
 The proposed law would be preferable to traditional financial sanctions, and would 
address Russia’s contract arbitrage in Ukraine more directly than these other measures.  
First, making debt unenforceable is less intrusive than freezing assets and blocking payments.
 47
 
At this writing, major global financial institutions are refusing to move money for sanctioned 
Russian clients and counterparties, potentially breaching prior contractual commitments.
48
 As 
noted earlier, Ukraine would retain the capacity to pay Russia; Russia would merely lose 
recourse to the English courts and the negotiating leverage from holding a big block of Ukrainian 
eurobonds. As proposed, the law would only apply to the enumerated contracts, and could 
include a sunset provision, restoring access to the courts at a later date or if certain conditions are 
met. It would be a tailored response to the use of private capital market contracts for political 
control. 
 
Box 3 
Debt and Dismemberment: The Law of State Succession 
If Ukraine were to split, it would be logical to apportion its foreign debt using a formula that 
accounts for some mix of assets, territory, population, and the original use of proceeds.
49
 The 
break-ups of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia led to apportionment, but without the scientific 
formula. In contrast, Russia kept all the foreign debt of the Soviet Union, along with its foreign 
assets (despite initial protests from Ukraine over its interest in the Black Sea fleet).  
Notwithstanding the history of territorial splits spanning centuries, the law of state succession in 
debt and assets is incredibly sparse. State practice is diverse and inconsistent, with factors 
weighing differently in different cases, creditors playing a role in some cases but not others, 
complex and contentious settlement negotiations spanning decades, all culminating in only the 
vaguest of principles to guide successor states.
50
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The 1983 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of State Property, Archives and 
Debts has only seven signatories to date (including Ukraine but not Russia)—so few that it is not 
even in force, with bleak prospects going forward. Even if the convention were effective, it 
would be of little help. It provides that debt should be allocated by mutual agreement.
51
 
Thus the legal instrument that might have been a natural vehicle for the public international law 
of Odious Debt offers no meaningful guidance or support whatsoever for Ukraine. One thing is 
certain: if Ukraine broke up, it would have to negotiate its debt allocation with the pro-Russian 
regions, with Russia holding some of the better cards in the form of its debt contracts. 
 
Second, making some of Ukraine’s eurobonds unenforceable would not require multilateral 
action, because they are governed by English law. It would be easier than shielding all of Iraq’s 
oil and gas proceeds from attachment by commercial creditors—as the European Union, the 
United States, and others had done pursuant to U.N. Security Council resolution 1483 in May of 
2003.
52
  Multilateral action was essential then because Iraqi oil and gas could be seized by 
creditors in any number of jurisdictions. In contrast, primary legislation in the United Kingdom 
would be sufficient to deal with the Yanukovych notes. Russia’s U.N. Security Council veto 
would not matter.  
Nevertheless, as the CGD Group aptly stressed, unilateral contract sanctions by major financial 
jurisdictions can look like illegitimate power plays. Moreover, unilateral action may lead to 
abusive lending migrating elsewhere, and a competitive disadvantage for the United Kingdom, if 
legitimate transactions move offshore for fear of future sanctions—a point hammered home in 
responses to the FCO consultation.
53
 Action by the U.K. alone may be expedient in crisis, but 
suboptimal in the long run. It would be important for other financial centers and other countries 
from across the income spectrum to issue public statements of support for the U.K. measures, 
and to implement similar ones in the medium term, to maximize the legitimacy and effectiveness 
of the proposed law.
 54
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Third, private creditors should support sanctions to curb Russia’s outsize influence over 
Ukrainian debt. This would be in contrast to the 2010 act of Parliament capping creditor 
collections from the world’s poorest countries, enacted over protests from capital markets 
participants.
55
 The U.K. Debt Relief (Developing Countries) Act 2010 responded to litigation 
against Zambia and Liberia, where a few private firms recovered large sums from countries 
eligible for up to 90% debt relief under the multilateral Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) 
initiative.
56
 These firms free-rode on taxpayer concessions, and diverted scarce resources from 
basic human needs. In response, the 2010 law said that private creditors may not collect 
proportionally more than government creditors in lawsuits against HIPC countries. The law only 
applies to debt contracted before its initial enactment on June 8, 2010. Unlike that law, which 
sought to enforce burden-sharing between public and private creditors, the law proposed here 
would target a single public creditor—Russia—to prevent it from free-riding on private creditor 
concessions and destabilizing Ukraine’s debt. 
Fourth, the law proposed here would operate similarly to the CGD Group and FCO contract 
sanctions: all three would make contracts unenforceable in English courts. However, because the 
CGD and FCO contract sanctions would be purely prospective, they would not help with 
Ukraine’s debt to Russia. Therefore, the proposed law would be retrospective, like the 2010 act 
to shield HIPC countries, the immunities for Iraqi oil and gas, and most versions of Odious Debt. 
The analytical case for prospective financial sanctions was made by Jayachandran and Kremer in 
2006,
 57
 adapting legal theories of Odious Debt. They argued that multilateral sanctions denying 
contract enforcement going forward would avoid some of the problems of Odious Debt in its 
original formulation. They would give creditors certainty, while reducing the borrowing capacity 
of sanctioned regimes, and the scope for ex post bias on the part of the sanctioning authority.
58
 
The CGD Group took this analysis further, proposing multilateral compacts to make a wider 
range of commercial contracts entered into by repressive or corrupt regimes “nontransferable” to 
their successors.
59
 
Their argument is persuasive and the proposal is sound; however, Russia’s arbitrage of the 
sovereign debt regime in Ukraine shows its limitations. The case against paying Russia seems 
compelling now that its military is engaged in Ukraine; it was not nearly as compelling before 
the troops shot unarmed demonstrators in February, maybe not before the Russian takeover of 
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Crimea. Contracts that give the creditor discretion, to be exercised in good faith, might be 
tolerable in peace time, but not when the contracting parties go to war.  
Furthermore, prospective contract sanctions hinge on the identity of the counterparties (despotic 
borrowers), while in the case of Russia and Ukraine, the form and terms of the debt contracts are 
a problem distinct from Yanukovych’s corruption.60 These terms were not public before they 
were agreed and posted on the Irish stock exchange website in December 2013. It would have 
been hard to specify the debt/GDP or cross-default clauses as problematic in advance. On the 
other hand, sanctioning all of Russia’s commercial dealings with Ukraine was implausible 
then—and continues to be implausible and undesirable at this writing, in light of Ukraine’s 
continued dependence on trade with Russia. 
A more radical way to stop governments from using private debt contracts for geopolitical gain 
is to make all such contracts unenforceable ex ante, on the theory that they might become 
abusive if the political winds change. This would fundamentally redefine large swaths of global 
finance, for example, making it impossible for central banks to buy foreign government debt in 
the secondary market to manage currency reserves, and would similarly affect export finance and 
sovereign wealth fund investments. It would also encourage workarounds through private 
proxies.  
In practice, a true separation between finance and politics would be undesirable and 
unachievable. What is needed instead is a way to detect and deter abuse in an institutional 
framework designed as if the two spheres were separate, and is therefore prone to arbitrage.  
The resulting options are uncomfortable. There is no way of avoiding ex post sanctions to 
address contract arbitrage, and thus no way of avoiding accusations of bias, power politics, 
commercial uncertainty and interference with contracts. This is the basic predicament of 
sanctions and Odious Debt alike.
61
 With bond contracts, there is also the risk that sanctions 
might trigger the very disruption they are designed to preempt. (Box 4) Nevertheless, if the 
sanctions are narrowly drawn and justified by specific reference to obnoxious contract terms and 
behavior to be deterred, they are more likely to be perceived as legitimate and gain support from 
a broad set of countries and market participants. They are also more likely to have a sound effect 
on lending going forward: debtors and creditors would be on notice that certain kinds of terms, 
lending arrangements, and debt collection strategies are inconsistent with international norms, 
and may not be enforced.  
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Box 4 
Default, Cross-Default, and Credit Default Swaps:  
The Contract Consequences of Sanctions 
 
It is a default under the terms of the Yanukovych notes, and all of Ukraine’s other foreign bonds, 
if they become invalid or unenforceable, or if Ukraine contests their validity. In theory, Russia 
could demand full payment under the notes if the U.K. enacts the legislation proposed here, or if 
Ukraine were to invoke Odious Debt. With the legislation in place, Russia could not sue to 
enforce this contract term; however, its demand for full payment could conceivably trigger cross-
default under Ukraine’s other bonds. 
This scenario is far-fetched for two reasons. First, the other creditors would have no incentive to 
call their bonds under the circumstances—not paying Russia would not be an early sign of 
distress (the rationale for cross-default clauses), but rather a way to preserve Ukraine’s scarce 
resources to pay commercial creditors acting in good faith. Second, a court faced with a creditor 
trying to cross-default to unenforceable debt might question that creditor’s good faith, and refuse 
to enforce the cross-default whose sole effect would be to push the debtor into insolvency 
without improving the creditor’s repayment prospects. It is hard to predict in advance how a 
court might come out in such a case, invoking principles of equity and lender liability, which 
leave considerable room for judicial discretion. Nevertheless, with no commercial upside and 
some legal downside for private creditors using the cross-default, the risk to Ukraine is small. 
Credit Default Swap (CDS) contracts on Ukrainian debt present a harder question: it is likely that 
a default or restructuring of the Yanukovych notes would trigger obligations to pay under the 
CDS. However, it is less certain that an act of the U.K. Parliament would do the same. 
Under a CDS contract, a protection seller promises a protection buyer to take on the credit risk of 
an underlying obligation in exchange for periodic payments. If a “credit event” such as a debt 
default occurs during the term of the contract, the seller must pay the buyer for the loss in value 
of the obligation. At this writing, the outstanding gross notional amount of CDS contracts on 
Ukraine was just over $19 billion. Because some market participants are both buyers and sellers 
of protection, the net notional amount of outstanding CDS contracts on Ukraine is much lower, 
at approximately $579 million.
62
 
CDS contracts are highly standardized under the auspices of the International Swaps and 
Derivatives Association (ISDA). As a result, the terms of CDS of Ukraine are well-known in the 
market.
63
 Ukrainian CDS cover all its foreign sovereign bonds, but not its loans,
64
 bonds placed 
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in the domestic market, or bonds denominated in local currency.  While CDS in some markets 
require that the underlying bond be held by three or more holders, this provision does not apply 
to Ukraine—which means that the Yanukovych notes, held by Russia alone, are not 
automatically excluded from the reference pool. Ukrainian CDS contracts trigger upon failure to 
pay, acceleration, repudiation, moratorium, or a bond restructuring that is “binding on all” the 
holders of the relevant bond issue (for example, when CACs are used to eliminate holdout 
creditors).
65
  
Refusal to pay, or a claim by Ukraine that the Yanukovych notes were illegitimate might well 
constitute a repudiation, triggering Ukrainian CDS. In contrast, an act of the U.K. Parliament 
making the Yanukovych notes unenforceable need not by itself constitute a triggering event, 
particularly if it does not result from a deterioration of Ukraine’s creditworthiness, but rather 
from concern that Russia would try to bring about such a deterioration for political reasons.
66
  
Whether a credit event occurs under CDS contracts is decided by a supermajority vote of an 
ISDA Determinations Committee for the relevant geographic region, each comprising 15 
industry representatives.  The committees have some scope for interpretation of ISDA contracts. 
In the past, they have sought to achieve an outcome that is broadly acceptable to the market and 
the policy establishment, while hewing close to the text of the contract.
67
 
In sum, although there is risk that Ukrainian CDS will trigger if Ukraine chooses not to pay 
Russia or restructure its debt, they are unlikely to trigger with contract sanctions alone. Perhaps 
more importantly, with less than $600 million likely to change hands in the event of a trigger, 
CDS should not drive Ukraine’s policy choices—nor those of its allies.  
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Objections and Counters: Tools for a Messy World 
There is a gap in the international financial architecture. Today’s fragmented sovereign debt 
restructuring regime seeks to deliver economic relief but has no space for questions of political 
legitimacy. At the other extreme, traditional sanctions impose economic pain for political payoff; 
economic benefit is not part of the equation. The debt sanctions proposed here bridge this gap. 
They address two important problems that no other policy tool does: the use of debt contracts for 
political control and hostile acts by a creditor government against the debtor. In addition, debt 
sanctions can deliver badly needed financing for Ukraine. Nevertheless, they are open to 
objections. 
The most common criticism of contract sanctions also applies to debt sanctions: They interfere 
with contracts. This criticism misunderstands both debt contracts and traditional sanctions. Debt 
contracts are routinely invalidated by the courts, rewritten in bankruptcy, and blocked by 
traditional sanctions. Traditional sanctions by definition interfere with contracts when they forbid 
delivery of goods or money transfers. Once Ukraine’s allies have decided to use sanctions 
against Russia, they have committed to breaking contracts for political ends, unless they design 
sanctions specifically to exclude existing contracts.
68
 Debt sanctions are more limited than 
traditional trade and financial sanctions because they do not prohibit the underlying activity but 
simply refuse court enforcement. 
A related objection is that UK efforts to protect Ukraine’s market reputation could backfire 
against the United Kingdom. A leading financial center cannot disregard contracts willy-nilly 
and stay leading for long. This is not an argument against debt sanctions but for using them 
rarely and choosing targets carefully. When sanctions are narrowly crafted (for example, 
targeting a single unusual bond issued by Ukraine), the benefit of the vast London market would 
continue to outweigh fear of sanctions for most debtors and creditors. Nevertheless, the United 
Kingdom would benefit from multilateralizing the initiative. 
Another related argument is that unilateral debt sanctions could be circumvented. For example, 
Russia or someone who buys the bonds from Russia could try to sue outside the United 
Kingdom. This would not detract from the proposed sanctions. Ukraine would have little to fear 
from such a judgment if it is uncollectable in the United Kingdom. Suing on English-law bonds 
in a jurisdiction friendly to Russia would also hold no attraction for mainstream investors, 
reducing the market value of the bonds.  
At the other end of the spectrum, some might press to expand the sanctions beyond the $3 billion 
bond contract with Russia. Including Gazprom arrears and holdings of Ukraine’s debt by Russian 
entities would deliver more relief to Ukraine and would send an even stronger message to 
Russia. Alternatively, repudiating all debt incurred under Yanukovych would discourage lending 
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to corrupt leaders. Such expansive sanctions would be harder to justify and administer. The $3 
billion bond makes a good target because it is particularly objectionable in form and substance 
and because it is easy to identify. As they gain experience with debt sanctions, the United 
Kingdom and others could consider criteria for expansion—or decide to reserve the measure for 
the most egregious debts. 
Another criticism would ask what makes speculative private investment betting on a donor 
bailout of Ukraine morally superior to Russia’s bonds. Such investment may raise a burden-
sharing problem but not necessarily one of illegitimacy and abuse. It can be solved in a 
conventional debt restructuring based on economic considerations without recourse to sanctions. 
In turn, debt sanctions are best suited to counter political abuse of debt contracts, which is not 
confined to government creditors but happens to be salient with Ukraine’s debt to Russia.69 
Finally, there is the awkwardness of a former imperial power unilaterally declaring other 
countries’ contracts illegitimate. The United Kingdom and the United States have both used 
military force in the past to collect debts and influence their neighbors (Perez and Weissman 
2007). Is it legitimate for them to punish Russia for doing the same? This objection has no easy 
counter. Major financial jurisdictions necessarily project political power. Sanctions are a 
transparent way to do it. It would obviously be better if sanctions were multilateral, but changing 
English law is the most practical interim solution. 
In sum, debt sanctions lack the moral clarity of forward-looking multilateral contract sanctions 
and of the more traditional visions of odious debt, where courts or audit commissions sift 
through a dictator’s debts amid the rubble left behind.70 Nevertheless, they would fill an 
institutional gap in international finance, put pressure on Russia, and help Ukraine. 
Conclusions 
It all comes back to this—for better or worse, sovereign governments cannot file for bankruptcy. 
Compounding the problem, the law on state succession thin and uncertain when it comes to debt. 
There is no court to sift through sovereign debts to decide which are good, which are abusive, 
and what to do about the in-between—nor to apportion assets and liabilities between Old and 
New Ukraine, as between Old and New Chrysler, should it come to this. Instead, there is a 
patchwork of contracts, customs, and institutions, which does a decent job of relieving country 
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debts burdens after they become “unsustainable,” or inefficiently high in the judgment of the 
IMF. In this patchwork, public and private creditors are supposed to occupy different corners and 
abide by different rules, lightly coordinated and occasionally adjusted to limit free-riding. 
Politics is implicit and contained. 
This system may or may not deliver the right economic outcomes—the right amount of relief in 
time
71—but it is patently unequipped to deal with the politics inherent in sovereign lending and 
borrowing. Russia’s arbitrage of the private contract form to gain political advantage over 
Ukraine illustrates one consequence of its failure. Whether Russia uses this advantage to further 
destabilize Ukraine is beside the point. It can. 
Denying enforcement to those private debt contracts that are most prone to political abuse—the 
Yanukovych notes—would help limit Russia’s advantage.  The U.K. Parliament should enact a 
law to that effect. Its adverse consequences for Ukraine, the United Kingdom, and the global 
financial system would be negligible. Beyond Ukraine, including prospective and retrospective 
contract sanctions in the sanctions repertoire would amount to recognizing of the obvious: 
private contracts can be used to advance military and political objectives.
72
 When it happens, the 
contracts should lose their claim to court enforcement. 
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